Product · BetterSign IdP · design partners
BetterSign IdP is the sign-in service your organization runs. Everyone signs in by approving on their phone, with no password to phish, reset, spray, or leak. Your identity lives in BetterSign, not on a device. It starts behind the IdP you already run, Microsoft Entra first, and its directory takes several admins to change.
The identity is the employee’s work VLAD; how they prove it is pluggable. Today: a device-bound passkey on an Android phone, or a tap on the phone through a linked browser extension. Every proof is checked against the employee’s provenance log and the organization’s own quorum-signed log, and a single Rust core does every cryptographic check. The first release is a small OIDC sign-in service behind your existing IdP (an Entra external authentication method first); SAML, SCIM out, CAEP and short-lived certificates are the longer-term plan.
amr/acr), so policy can require passkeys for a groupYour directory becomes a signed logbook, and your logins become keys on a phone.
BetterSign IdP is being built with a small group of design partners. Sign-in with a passkey on an Android 14+ phone works end to end in test builds, and a tap through the linked browser extension is built; iOS is next. The first release works behind the IdP you already run, Microsoft Entra first. SCIM provisioning to your apps, session events and certificates are designed and on the pilot plan, not shipped. If you run Entra, AD FS, Okta, Ping, or Keycloak and want to pilot it, talk to us.
How sign-in works
An app sends the employee to your company’s sign-in page. They approve on their phone, and your service checks that the key is theirs, they still work there, the phone is approved, and they’re allowed into this app. Ways to prove it today: a passkey on an Android 14+ phone, or a tap on the phone through the browser extension. Planned: keys in the laptop’s secure hardware, and Windows and macOS logon.
Your IdP hands off to id.acme.com over OIDC (first as an Entra external authentication method; a full SAML IdP comes later). The browser runs a WebAuthn hybrid ceremony with the phone, or a linked extension asks the phone for a tap. The validator checks the result against /keys/webauthn/<credId>, enforces BE=0, membership, device approval, and the group’s allowed methods, then the host issues an HSM-signed token carrying amr and acr.
An app (Salesforce, Slack, your intranet) sends the employee to your sign-in page.
The employee scans the code with their phone, or gets a tap on it if their browser is linked, and approves with their face or fingerprint.
Your service checks the signature, their membership, their device, and your policy for that app.
The app receives a signed login, through your existing IdP at first. Sensitive apps can re-check it themselves.
What you run
Admin keys sit in your HSM or KMS. The database holds sessions only, never credentials.
The employee lifecycle
Your directory (Entra) or an admin adds them. They get an invite, install the app, prove who they are, and an admin approves. No temporary password, ever.
SCIM in from Entra, or an admin or CSV → pending /members slot → app creates work VLAD + WebAuthn key → identity proofing → quorum appends active. SCIM out to apps comes later.
A role change is one signed entry, and the next sign-in reflects it. Pushing it to apps right away, instead of waiting for a token to expire, is planned.
Org-log entry → claim re-mapping at the next sign-in. Later: SCIM updates and CAEP token-claims-change.
Marked as gone in the log, and their next sign-in is refused. Ending every session, closing app accounts and expiring certificates within seconds is the plan.
status: terminated → change feed → sign-in refused, refresh tokens revoked. Later: CAEP session-revoked, SCIM deprovision, vlad-ca stops issuing.
Another of their devices vouches for the new phone, or IT recovers them after identity proofing. Every step is in the log.
Enrolled device signs the new key, or the recovery quorum rotates the work VLAD after proofing; /devices approval required.
Editions
The first release is smaller: one sign-in service that works behind the IdP you already run, Microsoft Entra first. The full editions come when design partners need them, so enterprises can customize claims, policy, branding, and connectors in the language their platform team already knows. None has shipped, and every edition must pass the same conformance tests before it does.
On request A full standalone IdP, planned as a single binary with a Helm chart, full SCIM in and out, session events, and a Linux PAM backend.
For cloud-native teams, or anyone replacing an IdP outright.On request Keep Keycloak. BetterSign becomes its authenticator and its directory, plus a Spring Boot starter for your apps.
For JVM shops, banks, and government.Microsoft first The Entra external authentication method is part of the first release, with an AD FS adapter if you run AD FS. AD certificate logon tooling and an AD FS replacement come later.
For organizations on Entra, AD, and Windows fleets.On request App middleware for Django, FastAPI, and Flask, plus HR connectors (Workday, SuccessFactors, BambooHR), SaaS provisioning, and an admin CLI.
For every edition’s integrations.Where it fits
BetterSign IdP is the directory and sign-in service. The rest of the organization solution builds on it.
One directory for every app: what arrives at each stage, and how to evaluate it behind the IdP you already run.
The solution → AvailableWhat each person carries: their work identity and the key that signs them in.
The app → Design partnersProve, factor, primary, authority. Stop at any stage, one group at a time.
See the stages →Questions
It can’t add people, change roles, or forge a login, because those need the admin quorum and the employee’s phone. It could issue tokens to apps that trust it blindly, which is why we recommend that your most sensitive apps check each login themselves. Token-signing keys stay in your HSM.
Only by rotating that employee’s keys, which is a signed entry in a log the employee can read, and their app tells them. Recovery and offboarding are possible; quiet impersonation isn’t.
Today: Android 14 or later. iOS is in progress. Computers sign in by pairing with the phone over Bluetooth; for machines without Bluetooth, a USB adapter or a FIDO2 security key enrolled as a second credential keeps sign-in phishing-resistant.
Yes. You run the sign-in service and the network it depends on, optionally on a private network, so employee logs don’t have to be public. Whether we also offer a hosted option for smaller companies is still open; tell us if you’d want one.
A sandbox, your IT team, one test app. No production change, no commitment.